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PREAMBLE

The trial in this matter and the briefing to this Court focuses the issues in this case upon
whether or not Mr. & Mrs. McVicars (Respondents) are going to be able to personally define what
constitutes a "private nuisance" or whether or not that concept is going to be defined by surrounding
fact, usage, and historical custom. The area surrounding the land in question, including the property
located throughout the Tammany Creek area -- a local agricultural area, and the historical use, as
well as the use of the contiguous land, are consistent with the Christensens' use of their property.
The Tammany Creek area strongly supports not only the building in question, but the usage of the
building.
If the McVicars are allowed to define what constitutes a "private nuisance" then they are able
to make that judgment based upon their likes or dislikes and what they want occurring on the
surrounding properties despite the fact that they consciously chose to operate their own construction
business and a granite business from their premises. What the Mc Vicars are asking this Court to do
is to enter an order removing an agricultural building and dictating what usage their neighbors can
make of their property despite the fact that when the building was constructed by the Christensens
(Appellants), the McVicars were operating their construction business and their granite business
from their property.

The granite business even created silica dust which has undefined

consequences, but went unregulated by any type of governmental authority. The Mc Vicars changed
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the usage of their property prior to trial. Why? They understood that their usage conflicted with the
position they were trying to urge to the lower court.
In contrast to the Mc Vicars' use of their property, the Christensens did everything they could
to make sure they were compliant with any and all zoning or governmental restriction or limitation.
The Christens ens went to the proper governmental authorities in order to obtain guidance and
direction, and then complied with the guidance and direction that was given.
The Christensens (that is Bret Christensen) even met with Mr. McVicars prior to building
to show him the dimensions of the building, the location of the building, and the intended use ofthe
building. See Tr Vol. II, p. 1073, L. 25; p. 1074, LL. 1-25; p. 1075, L. 1-5. Mr. McVicars now
contends that he knew it was going to be an outdoor riding arena but not a riding arena enclosed
within a building. Thus, Mr. Mc Vicars is asking this Court to believe that open lighting, unrestricted
dust, riding events, and other uses would be acceptable to them, but not if such activity is contained
within a building.
The Tammany Creek area is full of farmland, rodeo arenas, riding arenas, horses, and other
agricultural uses. The Christensens keep their property in immaculate condition and are embraced
and supported by their agricultural neighbors and residents of the area.
The McVicars made allegations that the building was a safety hazard, would blow away in
a 35 mph wind, and that the building had an 8-inch slab, none of which were substantiated nor
supported by the facts of the case. The Mc Vicars also made allegations that the building in question
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was not compliant with governmental regulations or impact zoning, none of which was supported
by the facts of the case. See Defendants' Exhibit F.
The McVicars pursued their claims with county authorities, attempting to prevent the
Christensens' usage of the building in regard to hay sales. The Mc Vicars' complaints were heard
as were the testimony ofthe surrounding neighbors. The county commissioners ruled that the usage
could continue with some limitations in regard to dust abatement and hours of operation.
Nothing can or ever will appease the McVicars. They complain about dust, but the testimony
at trial established that the building actually helped with dust abatement, because the trucks that were
loaded with hay were driven inside the building so that when the forklift lifted the hay the dust was
contained within the building.
The Mc Vicars complained that the building posed a fire hazard, but as the lower court found,
the building actually presented fire abatement properties.
The Mc Vicars complained about lights, but no one could argue that lights muted by the fabric
of the building would be less obtrusive than what an open riding arena would involve.
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
McVicars Home & Property. The McVicars essentially admit to this Court that they
operated a construction business from their property and started a granite business where they
imported and cut granite from their property, and then sold it retail to the general pUblic. Somehow
the Mc Vicars argue that this industrial and commercial use should be ignored and allowed, because
it was acceptable to the Mc Vicars.
3

Christensens' Use of the Property Between 2003 and 2006. The property where the
building is now located fonnerly pastured 50 to 75 head of horses with concomitant volume of
manure, flies, dust, etc. The McVicars admit that this usage did not bother them. The surrounding
fannland in existence prior to 2006 went unchanged, and one must assume that dust was a result of
said farming operations.
Christensens' Use of the Property in 2006 and Thereafter. Christensens' Use of the
Fabric Building and Property. The Mc Vicars are essentially alleging that they do not like the
Christensens' use of their property. The testimony at trial established that the building erected
suppressed dust and actually helped abate any fire potential, that the French drains avoided any water
run-off to the McVicars' property, that the dust abatement procedures were followed, that any
manure piles were moved below the Mc Vicars' property line, the Christensens purchased a decibel
meter to measure emitted sound from the building, and, with two exceptions, the lights were off in
the building by 10:00 p.m. (but almost always by 9:30 p.m.).
The Mc Vicars attempt to paint a picture ofthe Christensens being essentially obnoxious and
loud, whereas the other people from the area testified concerning how immaculate and beautiful the
premises are kept by the Christensens, how good and generous the Christensens are, how the
Christensens were appreciated, and how they appreciated the Christensens' usage of the property
because it complimented others' use of their own properties.
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Monetary Damages Related to the McVicars' Property Value. The McVicars had a
Realtor testify that she could actually sell the property for more than the value placed on the property
by Terry Rudd, the Real Estate Appraiser.
Continuing Conflict and Friction Between the Parties. The Christensens' family consists
ofamother, father, and five children, all of whom simply want to mind their own business and share
not only the love of horses but the responsibility that goes along with taking care of horses and other
agricultural-related activities. The Mc Vicars have attempted to demonize the Christensens. The
Christensens did not take thousands of photos of the Mc Vicars' construction business or granite
business. The Christensens did not run to governmental authorities to complain about the Mc Vicars'
use of their property or any other activities. The Christensens tried to be good neighbors and went
about their passion for horses and their agricultural existence consistent with the lifestyle of their
community.
This Court, nor any other court, is going to be able to mend the relationship between the
parties.
Adverse Impacts to Mc Vicars Health. The Mc Vicars did not present any medical evidence
whatsoever in regard to the impact this matter has had on their health. The Mc Vicars essentially
testified that all of their health complaints occurred as a result of the Christensens use of their
property. There is no medical evidence to support this allegation. It was simply a continuation of
their complaints.
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RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the district court properly find clear evidence and conclude that the cumulative
effect of the size, placement and uses of the Christensens' fabric building and
centralizing of Christensens' horse operation in close proximity to McVicars' property
and home unreasonably interferes with McVicars' lives and property and constitutes
a private nuisance?
The lower court specifically found that the use by the Christensens of their property was

consistent with the surrounding area.
The lower court was bothered by the fact that the Mc Vicars were upon their property first in
time, but should this dictate and define their neighbor's use of their property when their neighbor's
use is not only consistent with the surrounding area but it compliments other property users in the
surrounding area and is consistent with the prior use of the property?
This Court, nor any other court, cannot foresee what future uses individuals might make of
their property in agricultural areas. Buildings and equipment change, and there are a myriad of
changes that will simply occur as time goes by, but one cannot allow the Mc Vicars' likes or dislikes
to dictate future usage. The Christensens have followed any and all governmental requirements as
to pennitting, site location, zoning, building size, and usage.
If someone chooses to live in a residential area that is protected by covenants, that is simply
their right and they have built-in protections with that thought in mind. For the Mc Vicars to move
to an agricultural area, make industrial use of their land, and then complain about others is
counterintuitive as to what the defining element of a private nuisance should entail.
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With the lower court, the Mc Vicars relied upon a number of cases that were factually
distinguishable as was done by the Christens ens in their Appellants' Brief.
With this Court, the McVicars relied upon Penland v. Redwood Sanitary Sewer Ser. Dist.,
156 Or. App. 311, 965 P .2d 433 (1998) which involved sewage-related facilities:
" .. , As part of the sewage treatment process, the District reduces
incoming raw sewage to sludge, or biosolids, a bacteria-laden
condensed form of sewage, by draining the liquids from the
solids .... "
Id. at 3l3. Prior to, 1988 the District trucked the sludge to various sites for land application, but

after 1988 the district instituted composting on a permanent basis.
This case cited by the Mc Vicars is a good example of what constitutes a private nuisance,
and simply does not apply to the Christensens' use of the property where the testimony supported
that their property was not only beautiful and immaculate, but totally consistent with the surrounding
area.
The On1ega Chem. Co., Inc. v. United Seeds, Inc., 252 Neb. l37, 560 N.W.2d 820 (1997)
case involved two industrial type buildings where one was only placed 1 112 inches from the
plaintiff s building. The placement of the building violated the four foot width as required by design
specifications and the grain bins presented a fire and explosion hazard to the plaintiff.
There was no showing that the Christensens' building in question violated the illtemational
Building Code, the Uniform illtemational Fire Code, nor any other county, state, or uniform rule of
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construction or any type of set back requirements. The building also complied with its own building
code and construction requirements.
In contrast, the Mc Vicars seem to ignore the fact their granite construction business was

located in a building directly on the communal property line with the Christensens' property.
In the matter of Quinn v. Am. Spiral Spring & Mfg. Co., 293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855 (1928), it

involved a horne located in the city of Pittsburgh and the placement of heavy equipment by a
manufacturer of iron and steel springs. The manufacturer therein constructed their plant "locating
the largest and heaviest pieces of machinery unnecessarily close to plaintiffs dwelling."
It was shown at the trial that the vibration imparted to plaintiffs house by the

operation of the heavy machinery due to the place and manner of its location, was so
great that pictures and other articles were shaken from tables, walls, and
mantlepieces, plaster fell from the walls and ceilings, and, on one occasion, a brick
fell from the chimney. The injury to the house, as it weakens under the constant
shaking, will become progressively worst. If was also found, as a fact, that:
'The vibrations and noises are unpleasant at times cause a nervous
shock to those living within the house, and they seriously interfere

Id. at 156, 141 A. at 856.

Such facts are inapposite to the facts of this case.
Sans v. Ramsey Golf& Country Club, Inc., 29 N.J. 438,149 A.2d 599 (1959) appears to only

involve the relocation of some golfing tees.
In its findings, the court found:
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'The law of nuisance plys between two antithetical extremes: The principle that every
person is entitled to use his property for any purpose he sees fit, and the opposing
principle that everyone is bound to use his property in such a manner as not to injure
the property or rights of his neighbor.'

Id. at 499 citing Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752, 759 (1947).
The Mc Vicars' use of their property included a construction business and the industrial
manufacturing of granite. The Christens ens use of their property resulted in an immaculate, wellkept premises with extreme efforts to abate dust, noise, hours of usage, and water drainage.
B.

Did the district court properly grant a mandatory injunction requiring Christensens
to remove the fabric building from its current location on Christensens' property no
later than August 1, 2011?
It appears that the lower court was truly concerned about the Mc Vicars and the Christens ens

not being able to find peace between themselves. The deconstruction and removal of the building
is an extreme remedy when throughout the Mc Vicars' briefing and their testimony at trial, their
complaint focuses upon dust, lights, and noise. No court has the divine power to make the Mc Vicars
happy in regard to their myriad of complaints.

C.

Did the district court properly grant a permanent injunction to eliminate the
cumulative effect of the issues constituting this private nuisance by prohibiting
Christensens from relocating the fabric building, centralizing Christensens' horse
operation and driving or allowing vehicles not owned by Christens ens to be driven; on
any portion of Christensens' property that lies west of McVicars' property?
A permanent injunction should simply not have been issued if a private nuisance did not

exist. The Christensens were making lawful use of their property which was consistent with
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governmental authority, applicable governmental rules, applicable building codes, and prior use of
the property.
For a permanent injunction to be entered based upon the McVicars' complaint, it is not
supported by Idaho law.

D.

Did the district court properly find and conclude that the Right to Farm Act does not
apply to the circumstances of this case?
There is no doubt that the Idaho Supreme Court has the final say as to what constitutes a

private nuisance in this matter or in any other matter. The Christens ens strongly believe that this
Court has never defined a private nuisance as something that would prevent a person from managing
his land when he is located in an agriculturally zoned area and is lawful and consistent with the
surrounding area. A 2011 amendment to the Right to Farm Act simply gives insight into what the
legislature was thinking in regard to this issue.
The Christensens have conscientiously attempted to be compliant with local governmental
authorities, county officials, applicable laws or rules and regulations, and building codes and fire
codes, including set back requirements and building integrity requirements. The Christensens are
compliant with the Right to Farm Act as amended or as it was on the books at time of trial.
The Right to Farm Act does not need to have a retroactive reading since the building is still
in place and this Court is simply applying the applicable law to the existing facts.
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E.

Did the district court properly find and conclude that the clean hands doctrine does not
apply to the circumstances of this case?

The McVicars made use of their property in any manner that they desired. The use of their
property included operating a construction business, manufacturing of granite, and the retail sale of
granite. For the McVicars to declare that they have these rights and then file a lawsuit against the
Christens ens is by definition not only reflective of the applicability ofthe clean hands doctrine, but
it also usurps their argument that the Christensens' use of their property is a nuisance to the
McVicars.
In regard to the McVicars' use of their own property, the McVicars lay claim to the use of

the backyard and pool area, and, thus, it must be acceptable to them because they can control when
semi trucks deliver granite, they can control when customers corne upon the premises to buy the
granite, and they can control when their construction workers arrive and leave their premises.
It should be noted that the Christensens could not control any of these activities by the

Mc Vicars. But, because the Mc Vicars could control it, the Mc Vicars found it was an acceptable use
of their property, regardless of the Christensen's desire, input, or thoughts.
F.

Did the district court properly deny Christensens' motion for an award of attorney fees
and costs at trial?

The McVicars attempt to argue that the primary focus and the vast majority of the focus at
trial was not upon the public nuisance argument and/or the safety of the building in question.
A review of the McVicars' Complaint and Amended Complaint in this matter and the focus
ofthe testimony at trial clearly show that the extreme allegations by the Mc Vicars for both the public
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nuisance and building safety issues were never substantiated nor supported by the Mc Vicars, but
were costly and involved for the Christensens to defend, as discussed in more detail below.

G.

Should McVicars be awarded their attorney fees on appeal under Rules 40 and/or 41
I.A.R. and Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.R.c.P. 54(e)(1)?

In regard to the private nuisance issue, the facts ofthis case are extremely unique. When the
emotional element ofthe allegation is removed, the facts ofthe case are agreed upon to a surprising
extent. Many of the Findings of Fact by the lower court support the appeal on this matter. The
blending together of agricultural uses and residential uses is an issue that the state ofIdaho is going
to be faced with more and more as the years go by. Obtaining the guidance of the Idaho Supreme
Court is obviously helpful to the parties involved in this litigation, but guidance to others as the years
go by will be invaluable.
CONCLUSION

The Mc Vicars relied upon case law that deals with neighboring properties wherein a cattle
feed lot is opened, a farrow-to-finish hog operation is initiated, a commercial fertilizer plant is
started, and a lighted recreational field in a residential zone occurs. On appeal, they rely upon a case
where a sewage treatment process reduces the raw sewage to sludge or bio-solids and a situation
where an industrial building is located 1 112 inches from a plaintiff's building, or a manufacturer
places huge manufacturing equipment so close to a plaintiff's house that" ... pictures and other
articles are shaken from tables, walls, and mantle pieces, plaster fell from the walls and ceilings, and,
on one occasion a brick fell from the chimney."
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The Mc Vicars attempt to engraft such extreme facts of other cases to their cause.
For example, the McVicars in their complaint allege an 8-inch slab and that:
The building is subject to collapse due to inadequate foundation. In the event of such
collapse, there is a substantial risk that substantial portions ofthe building including,
but not limited to, the non-fire retardant fabric of the building will fall or be blown
onto the plaintiffs' home and property.

See R. Vol. I, p. 17-18, Complaint' 7.
Additionally the Mc Vicars alleged:
7.1
The building and its foundation will not safely resist the uplift and horizontal
loads shown on the building plans. Further, the building and the foundation will not
safely resist the required wind loads under building codes.

See R Vol. I, p. 96, Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint.
Whereas, the lower court found and the facts showed that the foundation ran 3 to 5 feet deep.
The Court found:
The structural and fire safety of the building were addressed at length.
98.
Rick Keane, a land developer, was hired by the Defendants to construct the
foundation for the fabric building. Mr. Keane testified the foundation of the building
is thirty inches at the southern end to five and half feet deep at the northern
end. Defendants' Exhibit P.
99.
Mr. Keane testified that the foundation is only twelve to fifteen inches deep
on the southwest comer because there is a rock shelf located in that area. For
purposes of constructing the foundation in the south west comer, Mr, Keane
roto-hammered pegs into the rock every five feet and poured concrete over these.
Mr. Keane poured the foundation in a monolithic manner, where the top of the
foundation is poured into a form, but at the bottom the concrete spreads out into an
earthen trench. Anchor bolts were placed along the foundation to connect to the steel
frame of he building

See R Vol. II, pp. 258-259 (emphasis added).
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101. Warren Watts, a consulting engineer, also reviewed the Coverall building
plans. Defendants' Exhibit B. Based upon the delivery of eighty-eight yards of
concrete, Watts determined the average depth of the foundation was thirty-seven
inches. However, for purposes of calculations related to the dead load ofthe building,
Watts conservatively applied a thirty inch average. Based upon Watts' calculations,
he determined the building met or exceeded the requirements called for in the
building plans. Watts testified that the building did not require a concrete slab floor,
and that the building would resist forces shown on the plan without a floor. Watts
observed holes as depicted in Defendants' Exhibit P.
See R Vol. II, p. 259 (emphasis added).

The McVicars alleged the building would blow away in a 35-mph wind, which since its
construction in 2006 has not occurred nor has any damage occurred. See Defendants' Exhibit F.
The Court found:
103. Paul Duffau, a licensed home inspector, inspected the fabric building to
determine whether there were safety concerns. Mr. Duffau noted there were no signs
of stress in the steel structure. Further, Mr. Duffau stated that the building has
performed adequately over a three year test of time. Within this time frame there is
no evidence of strain on the building as a result of high wind events which have
occurred in the area.
See R. Vol. II. p. 260, and further found:

The Plaintiffs' claim that the building is a public nuisance is premised on the
argument that the building is structurally unsafe and a fire hazard, therefore the
public is at danger because members of the public utilize the building for various
events, as well as to purchase hay from the Defendants.
Considerable testimony was presented regarding the structural safety (footnote
omitted) of the building and risk of fire hazard. (footnote omitted) The Plaintiffs
contend the fabric building does not meet the requirements of the International
Building Code. 31
Much of the focus of this case has addressed whether the fabric building is an
agricultural building for purposes ofI.C. § 39'4116(5), which states:

31
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Local governments shall exempt agricultural buildings from the
requirements of the codes enumerated in this chapter and the rules
promulgated by the board. A county may issue permits for farm
buildings to assure compliance with road setbacks and utility
easements, provided that the cost for such permits shall not exceed
the actual cost, to the county, of issuing the permits.
The Court need not analyze whether the building is exempt from building codes for
purposes of determining whether the building itself constitutes a nuisance. The
Plaintiffs have not shown by clear evidence that the buildiug is structurally
unsafe.
See R Vol. II., p. 278 (emphasis added).

But, as noted above, the McVicars make these extreme allegations but when the actual facts
are examined the building was a quality building, made in a safe and reasonable manner.
The McVicars make complaint of the dust, but when an objective, impartial representative
of the DEQ is called, he established that there is no invasive or fugitive dust. See Tr Vol. I, pp. 456
to 468, Testimony by Clayton Steele.
The McVicars make complaint of the manure, but when an objective person is called fi-om
the Department of Agriculture, Amity Larsen, she testified that the property was well kept, and the
smell was not offensive and within normal limits for fanning in the area. See Tr Vol. I, pp. 347 to
456, Testimony of Amity Larsen.
The Mc Vicars complain about the music, but when the police are called and an objective
voice is heard, the music level is deemed to be quite acceptable and appropriate. See Tr Vol. II,
pp. 709 to 728, Testimony of Lucas Martin.
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The Mc Vicars find the size and location of the building unacceptable to them, but did not
raise a voice of protest when they thought it was going to be of the same dimension but an outside
riding arena.
The Mc Vicars take a scattered approach to their accusations but when each is examined
carefully the only support is their testimony and their testimony is then contradicted by the DEQ
representative, the Department of Agriculture, police officers, contractors, engineers, neighbors in
the immediate area, county representatives and others.

It is urged to this Court to find that a private nuisance should not be defined by the extreme
allegations of the McVicars when the Christensens have made such a conscientious use of the
property resulting in immaculate and attractive grounds which are consistent with the integrity of the
surrounding area. The usage made by the Christens ens does not constitute a private nuisance as
defined by the law ofIdaho nor the law supplied by the McVicars.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 24th day of July, 2012.

Charles A. Brown
Attorney for Appellants.
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I, Charles A. Brown, hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing were:

o
o
o
o

mailed by regular first class mail, and deposited
in the United States Post Office to:
sent by facsimile to:
sent by facsimile and mailed by regular first
class mail, deposited in the United States Post
Office to:
sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery
hand delivered to:

Ronald J. Landeck, Esq.
Landeck & Forseth
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843

on this 24th day of July, 2012.
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